Aid, Marginalization and Indigenous People in Guatemala by Fenton, Megan M.
Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
Scripps Senior Theses Scripps Student Scholarship
2012
Aid, Marginalization and Indigenous People in
Guatemala
Megan M. Fenton
Scripps College
This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Scripps Student Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Scripps Senior Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact
scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fenton, Megan M., "Aid, Marginalization and Indigenous People in Guatemala" (2012). Scripps Senior Theses. Paper 77.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/77
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AID, MARGINALIZATION AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN 
GUATEMALA 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
MEGAN FENTON 
 
 
 
 
SUBMITTED TO SCRIPPS COLLEGE IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT 
OF THE DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PROFESSOR NANCY NEIMAN AUERBACH 
PROFESSOR MONA G. MEHTA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APRIL 20, 2012 
 P a g e  | 2 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................... 2 
Chapter One: An Introduction ..................................................................................... 3 
Literature Review..................................................................................................... 6 
Hypothesis and Methodology ................................................................................ 12 
Case Study ............................................................................................................. 13 
Chapter Two: Understanding Indigenous Marginalization........................................ 16 
Indigenous In Guatemala ....................................................................................... 16 
From Land Reform to Genocide ............................................................................ 19 
Aldeas Modelos ...................................................................................................... 24 
Chapter Three: Rabinal: A Case Study ...................................................................... 27 
Plan Guatemala ...................................................................................................... 28 
Qachuu Aloom ....................................................................................................... 30 
Chapter Four: Conclusion and Analysis .................................................................... 39 
Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 42 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank my readers, Nancy Neiman Auerbach and Mona Mehta of 
Scripps College, for working with me and helping me shape my thesis. This thesis 
would not exist without your help and encouragement. I am also incredibly indebted 
to Sarah Montgomery, Cristobal Chen and Edson Xiloj, of Qachuu Aloom, for being 
willing to share their experiences with me and always making time to answer my 
endless questions. I would also like to thank my advisor, Mark Golub, also of 
Scripps College, for talking me down from a few ledges and for always being willing 
to listen and give your advice. My gratitude also goes to the rest of the Scripps 
Politics and International Relations department and my family and friends for all 
your support during the last four years.  
 P a g e  | 3 
Chapter One: An Introduction 
 
In much of Latin America, indigenous people have a complex relationship 
with the state. This relationship defines many aspects of an individual’s life, 
influencing their social, political, and even economic abilities. Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in Guatemala, which has had a more tumultuous relationship with its 
indigenous population than most of its neighbors. 
Official census numbers show that about 40% of Guatemala’s population 
identify themselves as indigenous. The other 60% identify as ladino, which is the 
Guatemalan term for people of European or Meztizo descent. Less than 1% 
identified themselves on the census as anything “Other” than from these two groups.1 
However, Eduardo Sacayón, director of the Interethnic Studies Institute at 
Guatemala's University of San Carlos, argues that the percentage of indigenous 
people reported is inaccurate, as indigenous people are more likely to not be included 
in the census, and that the true figure lies closer to 60%.
2
 Most experts on the subject 
agree that Sacayón’s figure is more accurate, and most estimates land in the 50-60% 
range.
3
 
Whatever their percentage in the total population, indigenous Guatemalans 
are overall worse off than their ladino counterparts. A report given to the United 
Nations in 2010 on Guatemala’s progress on the Millennium Development Goals 
                                                 
1
 CIA Factbook, "Background Note: Guatemala", U.S. Department of State.  
2
 Danilo Valladares, "Forgotten Promises Leave Indigenous Peoples Poorer and Hungrier", IPS Inter 
Press Service. 
3
 Adams, Richard N., "A Report on the Political Status of the Guatemalan Maya" in Indigenous 
Peoples and Democracy in Latin America, p. 156 
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made this abundantly clear. Nearly 80% of indigenous Guatemalans are poor, while 
among the non-indigenous the rate is 40%. Furthermore, while poverty in Guatemala 
fell, from 56.2% in 2000 to 51% in 2006, extreme poverty, which primarily affects 
indigenous people, fell less than half of a percentage point in that same time. 
Indigenous children are far more likely than their ladino peers to be chronically 
malnourished, as of 2009 (58.6% of indigenous children are, compared to 30.6% 
ladino children).  While these numbers have improved since 2002, the gain for 
indigenous children has been miniscule (falling less than 2%, from 60.5%), 
especially compared to the gains made by ladino children (falling from 35.7%).
4
 The 
differences in these statistics between ladinos and indigenous people are 
considerable. Not only are indigenous people far behind the ladinos in all of these 
markers, any assistance they are receiving is clearly not making an impact.  
Because of these gaps, aid organizations have been channeling aid to 
Guatemala for many years. For example, between 1962 and 1979, the Inter-America 
Development Bank (IDB) founded numerous projects in Guatemala, covering 
everything from agriculture to public health, ultimately providing the country with 
more than $384.7 million in programs. Today, Guatemala receives more food aid 
from USAID than almost every other country in Latin America, the only exception 
being Haiti.
5
 Annually, they receive more than $32 million in food aid from the US.
6
 
                                                 
4
 Christian Tomuschat, Alfredo Balsells Tojo, and Otilia Lux De Coti, Guatemala: Memoria Del 
Silencio for Historical Clarification Commission 
5
 "Guatemala", U.S. Agency for International Development. 
6
 "Programmed U.S. Food Aid for FY 2010," United States Department of Agriculture: Foreign 
Agricultural Service 
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From 2004 until 2008, total estimated funding for USAID’s program in Guatemala 
reached $192.5 million.
7
 In addition to these large international organizations, 
Guatemala has become home to numerous smaller organizations. Since the end of 
the Guatemalan civil war, the Guatemalan government has permitted civil society 
groups to operate in Guatemala.
8
 These are often organized as non-governmental 
organizations, or NGOs, that are relatively small and work on a local level.
9
 
In addition to these outside organizations, both large and small, the 
Guatemalan government has created programs in order to address indigenous needs. 
However, these programs are often severely handicapped; one of the priorities for the 
Guatemalan government is to increase national unity. During the preparation of an 
IDB report, multiple senior government officials stressed that the government “is 
determined to avoid measures which may promote ethnic tensions and divisions 
within Guatemalan society.”10 The Guatemalan Constitution, however, recognizes 
the indigenous people of Guatemala, and compels the government to respect and 
promote their cultural rights. In 2004, a more serious national dialogue began to 
focus on the economic, political and cultural status of indigenous groups, resulting in 
legislation and funding meant to promote and protect indigenous languages and 
provide money for bilingual education. A report by the Minorities At Risk Program 
                                                 
7
 U.S. Agency for International Development 
8
 John Booth, “Global Forces and Regime Change: Guatemala within the Central American Context,” 
1998. 
9
 B. Abom, "Social Capital, NGOs, and Development: A Guatemalan Case Study" in Development in 
Practice, 2004. 
10
 Roger Plant, Indigenous Peoples and Poverty Reduction: A Case Study of Guatemala for Inter-
American Development Bank, 1998. 
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notes however, that this essentially amounted to lip-service, and actual follow-
through is yet to be seen.
11
 Ultimately, the Guatemalan government attempts to 
specifically address the needs of indigenous people, but ends up adapting their 
programs to address broader issues, such as poverty or education, rather than 
adapting the programs to serve indigenous communities. 
While there are all of these programs and organizations currently operating in 
Guatemala, it is clear that they are not functioning as they should for Guatemala’s 
indigenous population. This is clear from the lack of improvement in any of the 
economic markers noted above, such as poverty, health and education. Furthermore, 
these same programs are functioning for Guatemala’s ladino population, which has 
seen an improvement in their living conditions. The difference in the results between 
these two groups naturally raises the question of why this type of program is 
significantly less effective for Guatemala’s indigenous population than it is for its 
ladino population. Why are these programs not reaching this portion of Guatemala’s 
population? Additionally, there are some programs that are beginning to see some 
initial success on a local level, such as Qachuu Aloom, a garden project in Rabinal, 
Guatemala. Why might this project be succeeding, when other similar projects are 
not? 
Literature Review 
 
When considering economic and political development in underdeveloped 
countries, there are two major camps of thought, that of modernization theory and 
                                                 
11
 "Assessment for Indigenous Peoples in Guatemala." Minorities At Risk. 
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that of dependency theory. These two theories differ on many aspects, but perhaps 
the biggest difference between them is what they view as the restrictions or obstacles 
to development that underdeveloped countries face. 
Modernization theory consists of the idea that development happens in an 
essentially linear fashion. It holds that all communities or societies follow the same 
general template in order to achieve modernity. This “template” is based on the 
historical development of countries such as the United States, Germany and France, 
to name only a few. Because of this, all developed countries were once in a state 
similar to the state underdeveloped countries are currently in. Under modernization 
theory, the way to help underdeveloped countries out of poverty and into a more 
developed state is by accelerating them along this common developmental path. This 
is often done through investment by developed countries. Additionally, 
industrialization is valued under modernization theory, as technology is seen as a 
prime marker of whether or not a country is developed. A current case that is often 
pointed to as an example of modernization theory in practice is that of China, which 
has forged ties with more developed nations in order to grow its own economic 
future. 
Modernization theory views underdevelopment as a direct consequence of a 
country's internal characteristics, directly connected to the continuance of traditional 
economies, traditional psychological and cultural traits, and traditional institutions.
12
 
From this perspective, traditional values are not only mutable but must be replaced 
                                                 
12
 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, 1958; Myron 
Weiner, Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth, 1966. 
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by modern values in order for these societies to follow the path of capitalist 
development. Modernization theorists might argue that the reason that aid 
organizations and aid programs are not working in Guatemala is because they still 
put too much emphasis on cultural differences. In order for indigenous people to 
catch up developmentally with the rest of Guatemala (and for Guatemala to catch up 
to the developed world), traditional Mayan values and institutions would need to be 
put aside.  
One of the central claims of modernization theory is that economic 
development is linked to predictable changes in culture and social and political life. 
Stephenson notes, “The concept of modernization has to do with a transformation of 
culture and of personality in so far as it is influenced by culture.”13 Inglehart and 
Baker agree, saying “the rise of industrial society is linked with coherent cultural 
shifts away from traditional value systems, and the rise of postindustrial society is 
linked with a shift away from absolute norms and values toward a syndrome of 
increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting, post-industrial values.”14 In this view, the 
biggest obstacle for the development of Guatemalan indigenous people is their own 
self-identification as indigenous (and the values and traditions that go along with that 
self-identification). In order to develop, they must shift away from this identification, 
and thus, any aid that acknowledges or makes special concessions for this identity is 
actually hindering their ability to develop.  
                                                 
13
 John B. Stephenson, "Is Everyone Going Modern? A Critique and a Suggestion for Measuring 
Modernism" in American Journal of Sociology, 1968, p. 265 
14
 Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of 
Traditional Values" in American Sociological Review, 2000, pg 49 
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Dependency theory, on the other hand, has a very different view of the 
development process. Dependency theory first emerged as a response to 
modernization theory, and it argued that the aid that modernization theory presented 
as necessary for development actually had a very different purpose. Instead of 
serving as a way to empower and help develop those receiving the aid, dependency 
theorists see aid as a way to make the recipients become indebted to the givers. By 
receiving aid instead of having to provide for the goods or services themselves, 
underdeveloped countries become dependent on receiving this aid from more 
developed countries. Furthermore, dependency theory argues that not all countries 
develop along the same lines, rejecting the “template” model previously outlined. 
Instead, each country has its own specific traits and characteristics that direct and 
shape the ways in which it develops. 
Dependency theory notes that poorer nations, or “periphery” nations, are at a 
social and economic disadvantage to more developed nations, or “core” nations. In 
part, this is because periphery nations’ economies are substantially composed of 
importation and exportation, rather than internal trade. Because of this, periphery 
nations structure their production, not so that it fulfills their needs, but rather so that 
it fulfills the needs of the core nations with which they trade. 
Dependency theorists would argue that the reason so many of these aid 
organizations and aid programs fail is that they are too intent on achieving some 
external marker of “developed.” Instead of accepting aid in the form of modern 
technology and amenities, it would be better for Guatemala to be able to decide what 
they need most and what they are able to provide internally. 
 P a g e  | 10 
There is another method of looking at development, which is neither 
modernization theory nor dependency theory, although it bears many resemblances 
to dependency theory. In their book, The Subsistence Perspective: Beyond the Global 
Economy, Maria Mies and Veronika Bennholdt-Thomas craft and define a new 
approach to examining how economies (and the cultures that frame them) develop. 
Like dependency theory, the subsistence perspective views international trade as 
being exploitative towards the oppressed parties or nations. 
The subsistence perspective, like dependency theory, believes that the catch-
up development model espoused by modernization theory is not only undesirable, 
but is not even possible under the current global system. It is not desirable because it 
prioritizes a Eurocentric model of development; the proponents of the subsistence 
perspective point out that capital accumulation does not, in and of itself, fulfill any 
needs, except for making it possible to participate in the global market. Unlike 
dependency theory, which still defines development within a capitalist framework, 
the subsistence perspective focuses on what they call the “view from below,” which 
values an individual’s ability to “produce and reproduce their own life, to stand on 
their own two feet and to use their own voice.”15 This is contrasted with the “view 
from the top,” which is primarily concerned with the growth of the invisible forces of 
the market and assumes that everyone’s life would be better off with the 
accumulation of more capital. Instead, the subsistence perspective values subsistence 
production over commodity production, and advocates for local markets that serve 
                                                 
15
 Maria Mies and Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen, The Subsistence Perspective: Beyond the 
Globalized Economy, 1999, p. 3 
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local needs (rather than local needs being served through imports and long-distance 
trade). 
In addition to examining the ways in which economic relationships can 
disadvantage and oppress one of the parties (which dependency theory also 
examines), the subsistence perspective claims that social and political oppression is 
the root of the economic oppression. The authors of The Subsistence Perspective 
examine this primarily from a feminist perspective, but it also applies to other, 
similarly unbalanced economic relationships, such as those between peripheral and 
core nations. As part of their argument establishing the subsistence perspective as a 
feminist perspective, the authors discuss how the violence of the on-going, 
continuous colonization of women reinforces global capitalism.
16
 Part of this 
colonization is the systematic oppression and devaluation of women in the market 
economy. They argue that looking how the group has been marginalized and 
oppressed serves as a way to combat the actual effects of hegemonic ideas, which is 
more helpful for substantial development than simply trying to reduce dependency. 
Approaching the Guatemalan case from a subsistence perspective, one would argue 
that the majority of aid projects fail because they do not attempt to understand the 
social and political oppression of the indigenous people of Guatemala, which leaves 
them unable to actually change the heart of the problem; instead, they only can treat 
the symptoms: poverty, poor health and poor education. 
  
                                                 
16
 Mies and Bennholdt-Thomas, p. 30 
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Hypothesis and Methodology 
 
 While there have been millions of dollars and many organizations working in 
Guatemala to effect economic change, results have for the most part been negligible. 
However, Qachuu Aloom, a NGO in Rabinal, Guatemala, has seen some success. 
Looking at this case through the subsistence perspective, we would expect to see 
certain characteristics, both in the relationship between the indigenous population 
and the state, and in the organization’s methods that are apparently effective. 
 First, the subsistence perspective looks at the relationship between the two 
groups or parties at issue: the relationship between the oppressed and the hegemonic 
economic system doing the oppressing. For the authors of The Subsistence 
Perspective, the oppressive hegemonic economic system that they were concerned 
with was the patriarchy; for this case, it is the Guatemalan state and their attempts to 
enter the global capitalist marketplace. Through the lens of a subsistence perspective, 
we need to understand this relationship, and the ways in which the indigenous people 
of Guatemala have been oppressed, because in order for there to be developmental 
progress, the marginalization needs to be combated directly. In order to understand 
this relationship, the history of the indigenous people of Guatemala must be 
examined closely for the development of marginalization and oppression.  
 Once the sources of the oppression have been identified, we can actually look 
at the organization, Qachuu Aloom, and its practices. Below is a description of how 
the case study of Qachuu Aloom was conducted. We will also briefly examine 
another organization in Rabinal that is not seeing similar results to Qachuu Aloom, 
 P a g e  | 13 
Plan Guatemala, and its success (or lack thereof) at addressing the oppression of 
indigenous people. 
 Finally, we will be able to evaluate whether Qachuu Aloom is actually 
addressing the oppression of indigenous people and is effective for that reason, or if 
there appears to be a different reason for its success. The subsistence perspective 
may allow us to better understand how aid can best serve those who need it the most. 
Case Study 
 
Qachuu Aloom was chosen for this case study for a variety of reasons. First, 
they work almost exclusively with indigenous people in Guatemala; most of the 
participants are part of the Maya Achi people, and the board of directors is composed 
of indigenous people as well. One of the co-founders, Sarah Montgomery, is from 
the United States, but the project has largely been spearheaded by Achi members of 
the community. This is important because one of the features of a subsistence 
orientation is that it is perpetuated on a local level by people involved in the 
community. Additionally, it is important because having an Achi co-founder and 
being led by an Achi board of directors is atypical in Guatemala. The second factor 
that led to Qachuu Aloom’s selection is that it is unusual among aid projects due to 
its methodology and missions, many of which are compatible with a subsistence 
orientation. Qachuu Aloom encourages gardens not so that its participants can sell 
the produce, but rather to provide produce for the participants, who are also 
encouraged to work with and share information with neighbors and friends. The third 
reason Qachuu Aloom was chosen is that I had previous personal experience with the 
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organization. Because of this, I am familiar with the setup of the organization and 
could add my own personal knowledge to the case study. Furthermore, because I had 
previously worked with the organization, I already had connections to various 
members of the organization, better enabling me to perform interviews with the key 
players in the organization. 
In order to create the case study of Qachuu Aloom, several interviews were 
conducted. The most substantial were with Sarah Montgomery, one of the two co-
founders of Qachuu Aloom. Montgomery was interviewed twice: once by email, in 
January of 2012, and once through the video chat service Skype, on February 10, 
2012. Additional email correspondence was also conducted with Montgomery. 
Additionally, Cristobal Chen, the second co-founder of Qachuu Aloom was also 
interviewed via Skype, also on February 10, 2012. Finally, Edson Xiloj, the director 
of Qachuu Aloom, was interviewed, also via Skype on February 10, 2012. Besides 
the interviews, Qachuu Aloom’s website and the content posted on it were accessed, 
and I was able to add my personal knowledge of the organization; in 2007 I spent 6 
weeks working with them in Rabinal, Guatemala. 
 In addition to the case study of Qachuu Aloom, another organization, 
Plan Guatemala, will be briefly examined. An evaluation of Plan Guatemala that was 
created for Plan International, the parent aid organization was used, as was Plan 
Guatemala’s website. Plan Guatemala was selected in part because of this 
evaluation’s availability; actual, in-depth critiques of individual aid projects can be 
difficult to find on-line. In addition to this, Plan Guatemala was chosen because, as a 
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local branch of an international organization, its methods and even its goals were 
likely to be very different than those of Qachuu Aloom.  
 P a g e  | 16 
Chapter Two: Understanding Indigenous Marginalization 
 
Under subsistence perspective theory, it is essential to not only acknowledge 
the fact of oppression and marginalization, but to understand the source of that 
oppression. The historical context is necessary; in order to be able to move on and 
develop, one must counter the hegemonic ideas that led to the oppression in the first 
place. In this section, a deeper understanding of the indigenous people of Guatemala 
and their relationship with the state will show how first isolation was used to 
depoliticize the indigenous people. Next, hostile actions, such as genocide, were used 
to terrorize indigenous people by utterly annihilating huge portions of the population, 
which served to oppress and control indigenous people through fear and violence. 
Finally, through forced relocation and aldeas modelos, or model villages, the state 
was able to further dissolve ties, not only between the state and indigenous people, 
but among indigenous people and between indigenous people and their land, making 
political mobilization and representation near impossible. 
Indigenous In Guatemala 
 
Examining the indigenous population of Guatemala can be difficult, as there 
is no set definition of who qualifies as part of that population. “Up to, and including, 
the 1985 constitution, there is still no legal definition of who may be regarded as an 
indígena.”17 It is not clear that there even is a way to define who is a part of the 
indigenous population, as many proposed indicators are based on mutable social 
characteristics. How many indigenous people live in Guatemala “depends on how 
                                                 
17
 Adams 1994, p. 156 
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one defines who is a Maya, a question that is complicated by factors of perception, 
social definition, identity, social change, politics and technical usage.”18 The main 
factors typically considered when identifying the indigenous include land, religion, 
language, clothing, and beliefs. However, in Guatemala, land ownership is highly 
contested, and religions can be converted, languages learned, clothing changed. 
Ultimately, most scholars have allowed their basis to be one of identity: an 
indigenous person of Guatemala is one who self-identifies as such.  
The history of the indigenous in Guatemala is a complex one. Lovell 
comments that for Guatemalan Maya, conquest is not a remote, historical experience, 
but a visible, present condition.
19
 This may be in part due to the way in which 
Guatemala became an independent country. The official withdrawal of Spain and 
Portugal from Latin American in 1821 had less of an impact than the withdrawal of 
colonizers in post-imperialism Africa and Asia. “The [indigenous] peoples in much 
of the region had been not only conquered, but invaded, occupied, and internally 
colonized.”20 The former rulers did not return to Europe, like the colonizers of Africa 
and Asia mostly did. Rather than a fresh start, many of the Europeans and Mestizos 
remained in power, ultimately altering the inherent social and political structure of 
these countries very little. 
                                                 
18
 Adams 1994, p. 156 
19
 George W. Lovell and Christopher H. Lutz, "A Dark Obverse: Maya Survival in Guatemala: 1520-
1994" in Geographical Review, 1996. 
20
 Richard N. Adams, "Ethnic Conflict, Governance, and Globalization in Latin America, with Special 
Attention to Guatemala," in Ethnic Conflict and Governance in Comparative Perspective: A 
Workshop Report (Working Paper Series), 1995, p. 52-3 
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Since then, Guatemalan indigenous people were, for the most part, not 
assimilated into the European-Guatemalan society and culture, nor was there much 
of an attempt to do so, by either side. A government agency, the National Indigenous 
Institute was formed, but was given minimal funding and was never able to create 
any projects that would have any very significant impact on the Indian population. 
Its funding was cut constantly and later abolished entirely.
21
 Instead, indigenous 
people were generally dismissed and excluded from society. “The general pattern of 
civil response to Indians has traditionally been to ignore them as much as possible, to 
shunt them aside or to try to negotiate a quick and easy solution.”22 The Maya 
population, despite being a significant percentage of Guatemala’s overall population, 
was unnecessarily marginalized and not afforded the same rights and opportunities as 
ladinos.  
However, we must be clear that this was de facto discrimination, not de jure. 
“In Guatemala ‘fact’ and situations that seem to be realities do not appear in the 
national legislation. Nevertheless… legal documents do not establish discrimination 
against the indigenous people.”23 All of these factors led to indigenous people having 
very little political agency and being excluded from the general Guatemalan society. 
However, the relationship between indigenous people and the Guatemalan 
government was, at this point, not a hostile one. Instead, the two parties mostly 
                                                 
21
 Adams 1995, p. 54 
22
 Adams 1994, p. 159 
23
 Rodolofo Stavenhagen, Derecho indigena y derechos humanos en América Latina, 1988, p. 271 
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ignored the other; while indigenous people did not participate in the political sphere, 
they also had very few regulations placed on them.  
From Land Reform to Genocide 
 
From 1944 until 1954, there existed a period of Guatemala’s history known 
today as the “Ten Years of Spring.” During this time, Guatemala’s first 
democratically elected president Juan José Arévalo and his successor, Jacobo 
Arbenz, ushered in a society far different than Guatemala had seen before, complete 
with sweeping reforms, a society in which liberal ideas and ideals were taken 
seriously. President Arbenz was able to institute substantial agrarian reforms, 
expropriating more than half a million hectares of land and redistributing it to 
roughly 100,000 peasants. The majority of these peasants were Maya, and the chance 
to own the land that they worked on would have been unimaginable to their parents 
or grandparents. This was one of the biggest steps for Guatemalan indigenous rights 
that had occurred up to that point in Guatemalan history. Additionally, it helped give 
the indigenous a voice in the political sphere, as becoming land-owners gave them 
ties to Guatemalan society. Prior to this, few Maya actually held the deed to their 
land, and most worked on the farms of ladinos. 
However, the idealism and liberal society promoted by Arévalo and Arbenz 
came to an end in 1954, when a group called the liberacionista army, aided and 
equipped by the CIA, invaded. Fear of the United States led the army to pressure 
Arbenz into resigning and going into exile. The liberacionista regime essentially 
reversed all of the liberal reforms undertaken by Arévalo and Arbenz. The agrarian 
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reforms were rolled back immediately, and the indigenous lost the land they had just 
recently been granted. This understandably created a lack of goodwill towards the 
state from the Indians. 
In 1958, the army openly intervened in an election for the first time, by 
impeding voting for anyone other than their candidate, General Miguel Ydígoras 
Fuentes.
24
 For nearly 30 years (until 1985) Guatemala was led a series of what were 
essentially military dictators: although most of them were supposedly 
democratically-elected, the military is known to have interfered in the elections.
25
 
Not all of the presidents during this time were elected; several took the reins through 
the use of a coup d’état. During this time, the military was in a strong political 
position, which allowed them to implement a constant state of siege, suspend a 
majority of basic rights (including habeas corpus), and carry out assassinations, 
kidnappings, and something that became known as the cavalry of terror.
26
 
During this period, the president-generals focused on counterinsurgency 
efforts against political opposition, which effectively prevented others from 
participating in the political process. “The counterinsurgency campaigns of the 1970s 
permitted the military to deepen its control over state and civilian institutions, and to 
strengthen and make permanent its presence in the western highlands, where it had 
traditionally been weak or absent.”27 The western highlands were where the majority 
                                                 
24
 Jennifer G. Schirmer, The Guatemalan military project: a violence called democracy, 1998, p. 17 
25
 Robert Trudeau, "The Guatemalan Election of 1985: Prospects for Democracy" in Elections and 
Democracy in Central America, 1989, p. 94 
26
 Jose Luis Cruz Salazar, "El Ejército Como Una Fuerza Política" in Estudios Sociales, 1970, p. 96 
27
 Schirmer 1998, p. 18 
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of Guatemala Maya communities were located, and many of the “counterinsurgency 
efforts” targeted indigenous leaders, as they were seen as potentially having a 
political base. 
As the military began to focus on this area, younger, educated indigenous 
campesinos began to attempt to exercise some power of their own within Maya 
communities, and began mobilizing strongly for guerrilla groups.
28
 As the 
Guatemalan military began to be more and more controlling over every aspect of 
government, Indians became more disillusioned with the government in general. By 
1981, an estimated 250,000-500,000 in the Indian community supported the 
guerrillas. Army intelligence estimated that there were at least 360,000 Indian 
members of the largest and most organized guerrilla group, Ejército Guatemalateco 
del Pueblo (Guatemalan Army of the Poor, or the EGP).
29
 This was a way that 
indigenous people could participate in the political sphere and exercise their voice 
against the government that had oppressed them and isolated them for so long. 
Throughout most of the 1970s, counterinsurgency campaigns had been 
focused very selectively, with the focus being solely on those individuals who were 
actively involved in the guerrilla rebel groups or attempting to participate in politics 
themselves. However, when President-General Romero Lucas García (1978-82) saw 
that this method was unable to “eradicate the root of subversion,” the army moved 
steadily from selective repression in 1978-79 to massive killings. The Panzós 
                                                 
28
 Arturo Arias, "Changing Indian Identity: Guatemala’s Violent Transition to Modernity" in 
Guatemalan Indians and the State: 1540 to 1988, 1990, p. 251-252 
29
 Arias 1990, p. 255 
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massacre in May 1978 of 150 Kekchí Indians resisting having their land taken away 
from them was carried out by a Guatemalan Special Forces Unit. Unfortunately, this 
was only the beginning in a series of massacres.
30
 
The military began operating under what is known as a “scorched-earth” 
policy, where everything is killed or burned to the ground, in order to prevent both 
survival and the possibility of regrowth. “The primary objective of this scorched-
earth campaign—[known as] “OPPLAN Victoria 82” or “la pacificación” for 
short—was to separate and isolate the insurgents from the civilian population with 
full military support.”31 This meant that anyone could become collateral damage. 
The absurd contradiction of scorched-earth tactics, however, is that in order 
to accomplish this isolation, certain areas are targeted for massive killings: that is, 
the military must treat the civilians they are to “rescue” as though they are 
combatants, killing and burning all living things within the secured area. No 
distinction is made between combatant and noncombatant. Indeed, in the eyes of the 
army, there were no distinctions. If you weren’t for the army, you were necessarily 
for the guerrillas. Colonel Noack, one of the leaders in the field during this time, 
later commented that what the army failed to understand was “the phenomenon of 
campesinos being between two armies and not necessarily belonging to either.”32 
In this brutal campaign, the military was employing a strategy famously 
espoused by Mao—they were trying to “drain the sea of water [civilians] to expose 
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and kill the fish [guerrillas].” By depopulating an area and razing and burning it to 
the ground, that piece of real estate is essentially drained of the resources that the 
guerrillas need, depriving them of a fighting force, their logistical base, any sources 
of intelligence, and their capacity to blend in with the general population.
33
 
 Many times, there was a lack of distinction between the guerrilla fighters and 
the civilian population; ethnically, socially and geographically, they were cut from 
the same fabric. Indigenous people who were otherwise uninvolved with the rebel 
movement would help and cover for the rebels. This deepened the separation 
between the indigenous population and the state: while the Indians felt no personal 
connection to the military and even felt a certain disconnection, the guerrilla army 
was composed people like them—often even their neighbors and relatives. The 
guerrillas also went out of their way to help small indigenous communities. One 
officer noted, “We would arrive at a village, and despite the shelling, we would find 
no dead, no wounded, nobody…Later, we found out that the wounded or dead had 
been hurriedly carried by back up to the subterranean guerrilla hospital.”34 
Ultimately, however, this only enraged the army, and caused them to strike back 
harder against indigenous populations. 
The UN-sponsored Commission on Historical Clarification (“CEH”) 
undertook a complete evaluation of the situation in 1999, and ultimately termed it 
genocide against the Maya, despite the fact that the Maya were not the only ones 
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killed, saying that genocide is defined by the intent to destroy a specific group, not 
by the motive or reasoning. “For example, if the motive behind the intent to destroy 
an ethnic group is not of a racist character, but rather a military objective, it still is 
considered genocide.”35 Using the estimates of the CEH that 200,000 died (of which 
only 42,275 deaths were documented) and a 1979 population of 6.8 million, one of 
34 Guatemalans died. However, of the documented deaths, 83% were Mayans. If we 
assume that proportion for all deaths, and further assume that half of Guatemala’s 
population is Mayan (a conservative estimate) then 1 of every twenty Mayans died.
36
 
However, this number may be artificially low; assuming that documented deaths and 
undocumented deaths had the same proportion of Mayan victims is problematic. 
Since Mayans in Guatemala are more distrustful of the government and have less 
agency than ladinos in Guatemala, it is likely that Mayan deaths were under-reported 
relative to ladino deaths, leading to a higher percentage of Mayan deaths in the 
undocumented deaths than in documented deaths. 
Aldeas Modelos 
 
After OPPLAN Victoria, the military’s next course of action was placing 
refugees in aldeas modelos (model villages), under a strategy called the Plan of 
Action in Areas of Conflict (PAAC). This plan was known as “Techo, Trabajo y 
Tortilla” (Shelter, Work and Food), and the idea was that “tamed Indian 
communities—no longer a political threat—would generate new income for 
themselves and the tottering national economy by farming and selling new cash 
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crops.”37 This program relocated thousands of Maya to state-run housing, where they 
were kept employed through work in the fields, growing cash crop staples such as 
corn, coffee or bananas. 
These aldeas modelos had three major effects on the marginalization of 
indigenous people in Guatemala. The first was from isolating them from their 
communities. Villages were not necessarily kept together in the same aldea modelo, 
which decreased individuals’ ability to mobilize by separating them from people they 
knew and trusted. 
The second major effect of the aldeas modelos was from the forced 
relocation of the indigenous people. As discussed earlier, land ownership was a 
highly contested subject in Guatemala. Very few indigenous people actually owned 
the land they lived on, in the eyes of the state. They did not have deeds to the land, 
for example. This meant that when they were eventually released from the aldeas 
modelos, they did not really have anywhere to go back to. If they did, it was possible 
that someone else would have claimed their land and they would have no legal 
recourse. Additionally, even if no one else had claimed their land, because of the 
scorched earth practices, most homes and towns had been utterly destroyed and razed 
to the ground. 
The third major effect of the aldeas modelos was from the use of cash crop 
farming. This established cash crop farming in Guatemala as a dominant economic 
tool. When people were released from the aldeas modelos, they had become familiar 
with the tools and practices necessary for growing and harvesting cash crops. 
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Additionally, since they had no land that they had ties to, many of them began 
working on larger farms, rather than working their own land. Many of these larger 
farms produce cash crops for the purpose of exporting it. 
Ultimately, the aldeas modelos allowed the state to isolate and marginalize 
indigenous people even more than before. However, with the aldeas modelos, 
indigenous people as a group were not being separated from the state. Instead, the 
aldeas modelos served to isolate individuals, by separating them from their support 
system, and by relocating them and making it near impossible to return to their land. 
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Chapter Three: Rabinal: A Case Study 
 
Rabinal is a small municipality in the department of Baja Verapaz. It sits 
nestled in the Sierra Chuacas Mountains in the central part of Guatemala, less than 
100 km from Guatemala City. Despite its relative proximity to the capital of 
Guatemala, Rabinal is fairly isolated; getting there by bus takes at least 4.5 hours, if 
not more.  
Rabinal is predominantly Mayan—the latest census data shows that of the 
approximately 31,000 people, 82% identifies themselves as indigenous, which is 
significantly higher than the national estimate.
38
 While Spanish is taught in schools, 
many people also speak the native Mayan language Achi’, either as their first or 
second language. Its high number of indigenous people led to Rabinal being targeted 
especially heavily during the massacres carried out against Mayan communities 
during the 40-year civil war that engulfed Guatemala. The Río Negro Massacre, the 
largest documented massacre carried out during the war with nearly 500 killed, took 
place in Río Negro, a community in Rabinal.  
The combination of being predominantly Mayan and being home to some of 
the worst human rights abuses of the civil war has caused Rabinal to have especially 
high levels of poverty and poor health. This has also made it home to many aid 
organizations anxious to rectify the damage done during the war. These 
organizations, however, have had mixed success. 
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Plan Guatemala 
 
One such organization is Plan Guatemala, the Guatemalan affiliate of Plan 
International. Plan Guatemala has programs in 6 municipalities in Guatemala, 
including one in Rabinal.
39
 Plan Guatemala acts as a contractual partner of the 
national government’s Ministry of Health, and works to help the ministry put its 
policies into action. For many people living in rural Guatemala, the government is 
largely represented through contracts like this one.
40
 
However, this relationship with the government is constantly tenuous.  An 
internal evaluation of Plan Guatemala that was recently made public noted that 
“there remains a high level of skepticism within the government towards 
international NGOs,”41 which affects the work that Plan Guatemala is able to do. The 
evaluation noted that Plan Guatemala has little ability to advocate for “alternative 
government plans” and cannot organize public pressure on the addressing of human 
rights concerns, as they fear risking their relationship with the government. This 
means that their overall approach to development tends to be fairly orthodox. 
Additionally, they gain traction within communities by taking advantage of existing 
community structures, often working with city councils or the offices of local 
government officials.
42
 While this has some benefits, such as an existing network 
                                                 
39
 Plan International. "Plan Guatemala." Plan International, Guatemala. 
40
 Tosca Bruno-van Vijfeijken, Uwe Gneiting, Hans Peter Schmitz, and Otto Valle, Learning from 
Plan Guatemala: An Evaluation of Plan’s Strategy in Guatemala, 2009.  
41
 Bruno-van Vijfeijken et al., 2009 
42
 Bruno-van Vijfeijken et al., 2009 
 P a g e  | 29 
and access to an established local authority, it also discourages true change, as it 
connects Plan Guatemala with the establishment of the state. 
Plan Guatemala, like many other aid organizations, gives out material goods 
as part of their projects. The material goods vary depending on what the project is, 
but in the past have included water purifiers, fertilizer, and medicine. However, 
when the evaluation was being conducted, community members “frequently 
expressed their regret at not receiving more material help by Plan.”43 People were so 
accustomed to receiving material aid that they felt Plan Guatemala was not giving 
them enough supplies. 
Although Plan Guatemala has the support of both the state and the 
international organization behind it, the evaluation noted that it is struggling to gain 
footing in Rabinal, like many other organizations had. Oxfam, Action Aid and Save 
the Children had all had offices in Rabinal since 2008, and all of them are no longer 
operating there. Plan Guatemala at one point worked in 22 communities throughout 
Rabinal, but is now down to only 9. Furthermore, follow-up interviews in 
communities after Plan Guatemala “phased out” its operations show that the work 
done thus far has not been sustainable. “Community respondents observed a decrease 
in municipal activity and responsiveness after Plan terminated its activities in the 
area.”44 As a result, the patterns of dependency continue to exist in the area. This 
calls into question the effectiveness of Plan Guatemala and similarly-structured 
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projects. As one manager self-critically reflected, “I am not sure that you will see 
[Plan Guatemala] ten years from now.”45 
Qachuu Aloom 
 
In 2003, Sarah Montgomery came to Rabinal with the intent of starting an 
organization for widows of the massacres on a home-gardening project. She quickly 
realized that many larger organizations had already been created with similar goals—
but the projects had fallen apart relatively quickly. While local families would 
participate in the projects, their participation would only last for as long as the aid 
organizations were active in the region. Montgomery notes that “when the aid 
organization moved on, the families would stop planting their gardens.”46 
Montgomery (and Plan Guatemala)’s experience with this is not unusual.  
When she asked local women, Montgomery was told that the reason that the 
projects did not continue after the aid organizations left was that the materials needed 
to continue the project were too expensive to buy if an organization did not give 
them the materials for free. Without chemical fertilizers, hybrid seeds, and 
pesticides, the families did not know how to continue the project they had been left 
with—after all, they had been told that these supplies were not only better than their 
previous methods, but that these supplies were necessary. 
Unfortunately, supplies like these are part of the problem. Chemical 
fertilizers deplete the soil of nutrients. Aid organizations typically offer hybrid seeds, 
which produce bountiful crops, but do not produce well in the second planting, 
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which discourages farmers from saving seeds. As pests became resistant to the 
pesticides, they had to use more and more of them. Because of these factors (and 
others), the departure of aid organizations do not leave the farmers better off than 
they were prior to the aid—in fact, they are worse off, as their soil is depleted, they 
have to buy seeds to plant the next season, and the pests are stronger and resilient.  
As Montgomery considered these factors, she was approached by Cristobal 
Chen, an Achi farmer who had lived in Rabinal all his life. In 1980, the Guatemalan 
Army killed his newlywed wife and their child before his eyes, during the Río Negro 
massacre. Chen had heard about Montgomery’s plans, and wanted to work with her. 
He told her that he had approached other organizations in the past, but none had been 
willing to work with him to change their model. 
Chen was interested in implementing the Campesino a Campesino model 
(CAC) in order to protect traditional Mayan agriculture. CAC is essentially a model 
that facilitates farmers innovating and sharing their knowledge with their fellow 
farmers. While variations of this model have existed for hundreds of years, the more 
contemporary and more formalized version was developed locally in Guatemala and 
spread through Mesoamerica beginning in the 1970s.
47
 It is based on farmer-
promoters who have come up with new solutions to problems that are common 
among many farmers or who have recovered or rediscovered older traditional 
solutions, and who use popular education methodology to share them with their 
peers. A fundamental tenet of CAC is that farmers are more likely to believe and 
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emulate a fellow farmer who is successfully using a given alternative on their own 
farm than they are to take the word of an urban agronomist or aid worker. This is 
even more the case when they can visit the farm of their peers and see the alternative 
functioning with their own eyes. Chen had worked with CAC in the past with other 
farmers, and wanted to implement it in Rabinal. 
Montgomery and Chen together founded an association which they named 
Qachuu Aloom, which means “Mother Earth” in Achi’. Qachuu Aloom was created 
to address the problems seen by each of its founders. It was a garden project, yet 
utterly unlike those that had been brought to Rabinal in the past. Instead of 
dispensing materials like fertilizers and pesticides, Qachuu Aloom led classes on 
traditional methods and on seed production. While they did give out seeds, they 
would require the farmers to pay back the seeds after the harvest, in order to 
encourage the farmers to let a portion of the harvest go to seed. This allowed the 
farmers not only to “pay back” Qachuu Aloom, but to collect seeds for themselves 
for the following year. 
This was not an easy sell to the farmers of Rabinal. In our interview, 
Montgomery recounted the response she and Chen would receive.  
“The first year as we went village to village trying to 
promote the project, we would contact a community 
leader and have them get people from the village 
together. When we explained the idea, people would 
raise their hand and ask, “What are you going to give 
us? Metal for our roofs, seeds, fertilizers, animals, water 
tanks?” And when we would explain that we were not 
going to give anything away for free, more than half of 
the room would get up and leave. They were not 
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interested… It was much easier to wait for the hand-outs 
from other projects.”48 
 
The fact that they received the same (or a similar) response as Plan Guatemala did 
only emphasizes how deeply engrained dependency is within this population.  
Despite this, Chen and Montgomery were able to organize a core group of 12 
Achi individuals, both male and female, who were interested in the missions of 
Qachuu Aloom. As they began to work with this group, Chen encouraged them to 
use the CAC model in order to spread their knowledge to their neighbors. “At first, 
they said they felt embarrassed because their neighbors would make fun of them for 
carrying cow manure and making compost piles. But then when those same 
neighbors saw the results and realized that with a little work you could have free 
fertilizer by making your own compost, they began to copy us,”49 he told me. By the 
end of the first year, Qachuu Aloom was working with 50-60 individuals across 
Rabinal. 
Qachuu Aloom looks at individual gardens as serving three functions. They 
produce vegetables for home consumption, alleviating the need to buy food from 
others. They allow for some plants to go to seed; as the seeds that are given out by 
Qachuu Aloom are open-pollinated (also known as heirloom) rather than hybrid, the 
second planting of these seeds does not suffer the same problems as that of the seeds 
given out by aid organizations. This helps break the dependency on outside aid 
projects or on buying seeds from a store. Finally, (and this is seen as the least 
important of the garden functions), they also produce vegetables for sale in the 
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market, which both lowers the price of these vegetables for others by increasing 
supply and provides for some cash income for the individual farmers. 
Today, Qachuu Aloom works with about 500 families throughout Rabinal. 
Not all of these families are Achi, but the vast majority is. They have expanded the 
ways in which they work beyond classes and gardens, although those are still their 
primary focus. Today, Qachuu Aloom buys surplus seeds from families and markets 
them around the country. They promote these seeds to some larger aid organizations, 
such as the FAO, CARE, SHARE, Catholic Charities, and Save the Children, all of 
which now buy seeds from Qachuu Aloom. While working with larger aid 
organizations may initially seem contrary to Qachuu Aloom’s goal of reducing 
dependency, Montgomery suggests that selling to these organizations does work 
towards that goal, as doing so allows “more small family farmers gain access to these 
heirloom seeds again. Even if they received the seeds from an aid organization 
initially, they don’t have to continue working with [the aid organization] in the future 
but they’ll still have access to the seeds.”50 
In addition to their national seed market, Qachuu Aloom has a garden of their 
own, which they use as teaching center to demonstrate the traditions and techniques 
to others. They also use this teaching center as “sort of a community center,” as 
Montgomery described it to me. They host events there that celebrate Mayan 
traditions and culture. Individuals involved in the project also will bring work there 
and do it in a communal fashion. For example, Chen described to me groups of 
women gathering to grind amaranth into flour and package it together; each woman 
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brought her own farm’s harvest of amaranth, and left with her own amount of flour. 
This Qachuu Aloom garden contains “a seed storage facility, rain-water catchment 
tanks, a medicinal plant garden, compost piles, worm-bins for composting, a solar 
plant drier, a solar energy-powered well, a cob building and a bamboo education 
center.”51 
Furthermore, Qachuu Aloom has begun to receive visits from groups, both 
national and international, who come to learn more about their development model 
and their implementation of CAC. They also have started a micro-lending program 
that has given loans of $50 to $200 to more than 100 of their families to help them 
start small businesses, and have a scholarship program that helps about 10 girls a 
year attend school. 
As Qachuu Aloom has expanded, it has faced opposition from outside forces. 
Initially, local officials opposed Qachuu Aloom because they, like the farmers, liked 
the type of development projects that brought in free materials. Often, local leaders 
receive benefits from helping aid organizations manage donations. However, as they 
saw the results and more people began working with Qachuu Aloom, Montgomery 
saw this opposition fade away. 
More serious opposition comes from the systematic devaluation of the type of 
work that Qachuu Aloom does. The University in Guatemala City’s Agronomy 
department, for example, requires students to do an internship at a related 
organization or on a large farm prior to graduation. They sent an intern to Qachuu 
Aloom one year, but then determined Qachuu Aloom was “too radical” and no 
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longer approve Qachuu Aloom internships. Edson Xiloj, who had been the intern 
who was sent to Qachuu Aloom, continues to work with the association today, as its 
director. He explained, “They want their students to graduate and work for large 
fincas [farms] who are exporting to the US. Many of the professors get their research 
money from large companies like Monsanto, and some of them work for these 
companies on the side, so they have a very different agenda, and want their students 
to follow more conventional export models of agriculture.”52  He also noted that the 
university classes taught that organic agriculture doesn’t work, and that local seeds 
are useless. Xiloj was the only indigenous person in his class at the university. 
It is not just the agricultural methods that are denigrated, however. Qachuu 
Aloom also works to preserve the more ceremonial Mayan traditions that surround 
agriculture. Montgomery noted “Because there is so much racism here, a lot of these 
traditions are looked down upon.”53 When Xiloj first interned with Qachuu Aloom, 
he viewed Qachuu Aloom’s workshops on these traditions as a waste of time. As he 
became more familiar with the association, however, his views began to change. 
Montgomery recalls how as he began to participate in the workshops, Xiloj told her, 
“Sarah, this is nothing new; this is what I learned from my grandparents.” 
However, Xiloj’s initial distaste for the traditions and workshops is not 
uncommon, especially among the more educated. Qachuu Aloom has been described 
as an “atraso.” In Spanish, this literally means “backwardness”—it is seen as going 
back in time, not into the future. By incorporating ancient practices that have only 
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recently fallen out of use in modern times, Qachuu Aloom is accorded little value, 
much like Maya culture in general. 
Besides the University, other aid programs oppose Qachuu Aloom. 
Montgomery believes it is because they are having a more difficult time organizing 
projects in the communities Qachuu Aloom works in. Because people now have their 
own seed source to use to replant their gardens, as well as seeds to sell to bring 
income to their families, they no longer are dependent on these other projects. 
Montgomery added, “many times [the people] refuse to participate or force that 
project to come to us to buy their seeds.  The families we work with are seeing the 
results of the project and learning to protect their seed source.”54 
Today’s Qachuu Aloom is run by a board of directors and registered with the 
Guatemalan government as a legal Non-Governmental Organization, or NGO. This 
allows Qachuu Aloom to receive internal funding via grants and donations. The 
board was initially made up entirely of Achi who had participated in the first few 
years of the project. Montgomery notes the difficulty of this, since most of the 
participants have little to no formal education. “Some of the women don’t speak 
Spanish, only Achi’, and can’t read or write; many of the men speak Spanish but it is 
a mixture of Spanish and their Native language Achi’.”55 However, to qualify for 
grants (especially large government grants), Qachuu Aloom needs people with a 
higher education level to help manage and run the programs. Montgomery explains, 
however, that the problem is that “there is a large difference between the realities 
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that they have lived versus the campesinos we work with on our staff, on our board 
and in the communities. They use words that are too big, or talk too fast for people to 
understand.”56 
Overall, Montgomery feels that Qachuu Aloom has remained true thus far to 
its initial mission. Qachuu Aloom has managed to reintroduce several native 
varieties to the Rabinal area that had been lost. Additionally, the lives of the families 
who participate in the program have improved—she notes that “many of our 
members tell us they no longer need to go on seasonal migrations to work on the 
coffee or sugar plantations on the coast.”57 Instead, the members are able to provide 
enough food for their families and generate enough income to support their families 
through selling seeds and vegetables at the local market. 
Furthermore, Montgomery points out that Qachuu Aloom is set up so that it 
does not need to be an active force for its projects to continue. Unlike the previous 
aid projects in Rabinal, Qachuu Aloom focuses on providing workshops educating 
the participants on the specific methods necessary to maintain and carry on the 
project themselves. This means that if Qachuu Aloom were to be disbanded, the 
current members would not lose this source of food and income, the way that they 
did when aid organizations stopped providing fertilizers and hybrid seeds. 
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Chapter Four: Conclusion and Analysis 
 
In order to understand Guatemala’s indigenous people and how to best use 
aid to actually make a substantial difference in their lives, it is essential to understand 
the context of how they reached the point they are currently at. The subsistence 
perspective advocates this, but many aid organizations ignore this in favor of a more 
modernization-based approach. 
  Plan Guatemala, for example, uses a fairly orthodox modernization-based 
approach in Rabinal, Guatemala. They attempt to make substantial change by gifting 
material aid. However, they have not seen much of a change. Their own project 
managers are discouraging about the future of Plan Guatemala. 
 Qachuu Aloom, on the other hand, uses more of a subsistence approach, 
which pays attention to the ways in which individuals have been marginalized in the 
past. By doing this, the thought is that aid is actually able to combat the 
marginalization itself, and not merely the economic side effects of that 
marginalization. 
 In Guatemala, the indigenous people have had a long and violent history with 
the state. One of the clearest consequences of this is their complete and utter 
isolation. They have long been isolated from the state and the economic market, as 
indigenous people as a group were discriminated against and have no institutional 
power. The state’s use of aldeas modelos also fostered isolation, albeit of a different 
nature. That isolation came from the breaking down of support systems and 
communities. The social capital that comes from a community can help mobilize and 
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organize groups that are being oppressed, and the Guatemalan state destroyed that 
capital for its indigenous population. In addition to becoming individually isolated 
from one another, the aldeas modelos also severed indigenous ties to their land. Not 
having land means that individuals are going to be more dependent on others, and in 
many cases this meant that the landless individuals would go to work on a large, 
internationally-owned finca, which only worsens Guatemalan dependency. 
 Qachuu Aloom’s methods work to counter this isolation. By encouraging 
people to plant home gardens, rather than work on a finca on someone else’s land, 
new ties to the land are being built. Additionally, these ties are strengthened through 
Qachuu Aloom’s workshops that teach methods of improving the resources 
available, such as natural fertilization or tiered gardens, as this promotes greater 
understanding and familiarity with the land. 
 Far more important however, than ties to the physical land, is the social 
capital that Qachuu Aloom is helping its participants gain. The Campesinos a 
Campesinos model that they use encourages user-to-user communication and 
collaboration. In addition to fostering a sense of community, they are also alleviating 
the need to participate in the market that isolated them in the first place. 
 These methods, while irregular, do appear to be effective in the case of 
Qachuu Aloom. Health and nutrition are improved among its participants, and other 
markers not directly related to the gardening, such as school attendance among 
children, are also improving. 
 It must be noted that this is only one case. Furthermore, the results have not 
yet withstood the test of time; Qachuu Aloom is less than a decade old. However, 
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neither of those facts lessens the validity or the effectiveness of Qachuu Aloom. 
More research would have to be done before being able to say, with certainty, about 
the overall effectiveness of these methods across organizations and cultures, but 
these initial results are promising. 
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